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gyt's revolution did not end on February 11, 2011.
Despite the removal of Hosni Mubarak from the presidency, the former Mubarak regime remains entrenched
in Egypt's economic and political system. 1 This is evident from
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' (SCAF) June 2012
power grab of legislative authority after dissolving parliament
-a move many consider to have been a virtual military coup
d'etat.2 Skeptics argue SCAF is merely a Mubarak holdover
until the old regime can reinvent itself under a new guise.
Former Prime Minister and Mubarak confidant Ahmed Shafiq's
near win against the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi
in the presidential elections may be proof of this. 3 A Shafiq
presidency would have instantly nullified gains made through
the last eighteen months of protests, sacrifices, and deaths by
millions of Egyptians.
But today, even with a Morsi
victory, one is hard-pressed
to find significant changes to
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Although the current political landscape differs from the day
preceding the January 25 revolution, Egypt appears to suffe
from a familiar syndrome: for every step taken towards mean
ingful reform, it falls back two steps due to entrenched count(r
revolutionary forces. This began the moment the military took
control of the executive branch on February 11l, 2011 only t
unilaterally replace the 1971 constitution with its own interim
Constitutional Declaration on March 30, 2011.8 This dubiou
document unilaterally imposed
by SCAF barely holds Egyp
together as the country faces o
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Even if a bill became law, implementation was a
enormous hurdle because enforcement has always been a majo
impediment to establishing rule of law in Egypt. So long a
holdover Mubarak officials controlled the bureaucracy and secu
rity forces, the few reform laws promulgated were as valueles
as the paper on which they were written.
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ship role. They have used significant investment
fears the Mubarak-era political apparatus is far
in the Egyptian economy to leverage influence i
from eliminated. Thus, whatever progress achieved by reformers
Egyptian society through various means. The most obvious mani
since Mubarak's overthrow is quickly being undermined by
festation of these efforts is the growing Salaf!movement in Egypt
counter-revolutionaries and the military.
which is notorious for adopting stringently literalist interpretation
of the Quran. Fourth, the rate of poverty has risen at an alarming
Against this political backdrop, this essay argues Egypt
rate while a select cadre of Egyptians flaunts its corruptly acquire
is still in the midst of a revolution and has yet to enter the
wealth." 4The rapidly increasing gap between the poor and the ric
post-revolutionary phase of nation-building. The essay starts
coupled with the near extinction of the middle class was a veritabl
by providing a brief summary of the political context of the
powderkeg. Finally and often overlooked, is the deeply seate
post-Mubarak transition. Central to understanding the context is
classism that dominates Egyptian culture. Higher-rung Egyptians
identifying the key political actors and their roles in the ongoing
elitist allergic reactions to lower socio-economic classes imped
struggle to reshape Egypt's political landscape. Finally, this
egalitarian reforms necessary for a vigorous democratic system.
essay highlights the importance of the rule of law to steer Egypt
The liberal and revolutionaries' failure to win votes in rural and
through an inevitably turbulent phase at this historic juncture.
urban poor electorates is a testament to this. 15
In many ways, the heated contestation for power is a healthy indicator of Egyptians' investment in their nation in stark contrast to
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Without rule of law, hows
ever, the citizenry will again disengage from the political system
as it discovers its votes and voices areoI irrelevant to the broader
power struggle k(}
between1~the military
~~a and Muslim1 Brotherhood.
In perspective, Egypt's experience could have turned out
much worse compared to other nations undergoing revolutions
(see: Syria). However, that alone does not curtail Egyptians' wellgrounded demands of a government at the service of the people
and not the other way around. Until leaders who are entirely

separate from the former regime and its entrenched interests are
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Although a nominally civilian government controlled Egypt
every president since the 1952 overthrow of the British-backe
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Alitical realignment is inevitable in Egypt, the United States
ill continue to be a key player in Egyptian politics.

by the military to decrease the number of revolutionaries.
Still, eighteen months after the start of the revolution, much
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There is no doubt Egypt was forever changed on January
5 2011. The seal of fear deeply rooted in the Egyptian psyche
as broken, releasing decades of pent-up deprivation. For those
miliar with Egypt, witnessing millions of Egyptians taking to
e streets, stridently demanding the fall of the regime was nothg short of surreal. Although a revolution seemed imminent
iery year as economic conditions in Egypt rapidly deteriorated,
gyptians seemed cursed with a bottomless tolerance for sufferg. Fortunately for the country's future, the generation of youth
hose futures had been sabotaged by a corrupt and tyrannical
("Liberation") Square.
k Tahrir 11
gime took the fateful steps into

has changed in Egypt. For the first time in their lives, millions
of Egyptians voted in parliamentary and presidential elections. 45
The importance of this lies not so much in the action of voting
but rather Egyptians' newfound trust in the relevance of their
votes. In March 2011l, Egyptians across socioeconomic lines
actively debated whether they should draft a new constitution
before or after electing a parliament. New voices that moderated
lively debates among candidates quickly replaced television
pundits puppeted by the Mubarak regime. Diverse viewpoints
on various TV channels, newspapers, and opposition media subsumed once dominant state-sponsored media. The consequent
political energy has been palpable notwithstanding the bumpy
transition process.

For the first ten months of the revolution up until the new
irliament took office, the military responded to the protesters
-much the same way as its friend and former benefactor,
ubarak. It exercised broad authorities under emergency law,
.rdedhundreds of protestors into military courts where they
id no due process rights, tortured detainees by the thousands,
d shut down nonprofit organizations that challenged its practices. 40
any of those abusive tactics failed, it warned the people of a foreignchaos.
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In addition to these familiar tactics, the military desperately
topted even more aggressive tactics to offset its waning legiti.acy. Women protesters became targets of assault and sexual
trassment by the police and counter-revolutionaries. 4 Military
Tficers coercively performed virginity tests on female detainees,
)gnizant this form of torture is the most psychologically
miliating in a socially conservative Muslim country. 42 This
tong-armed control measure had the effect as well, to warn
her women to stay home. When confronted on television about
ch practices, military officers dismissed their victims as loose
omen who "were not like our girls at home. ''43 It was a mesLg
e to a ll fathe rs, husb an d s, an d b ro the rs to ke e p the ir wo me nN
)me lest they be corrupted by these promiscuous female
"otesters and ultimately be similarly treated when captured,.
ore distressing is the fact women were sexually assaulted ata a
Dubling rate. The reported cases were just the tip of the iceberg
the actual number of women who paid a heavy price for their
tempts to oust the military regime. Ironically, while protesting
e sexual assaults, women were accused of destabilizing the

Another new development is the empowerment of Egyptian
youth in an otherwise patriarchal system that once simply
dismissed their grievances. Coined as the "revolutionary youth,"
millions of young people of different political persuasions
bucked tradition by refusing the older generation's monopoly
over political power. This assortment of economically diverse
and politically inexperienced young people had worn the yoke
of governmental oppression for far too long. In a combined
front, they demanded justice, fairness, accountability, the rule
o agru rubcmn
t e eas twscniee
1ulc
of law, and political, civil, and human rights. Despite its leaderless and seemingly rudderless revolutionary fervor, the group's
persistent return to Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of the
revolution, each time the military overreaches has transformed
it into a potent political force. Magnifying its efficacy, the
younger generation's mastery of the latest social media technology permits the group to quickly share information, monitor
government wrongdoing, and mobilize back to "the Square"
even after repeated expulsions. Tenacity appears to make up
for the revolutionary youth's small numbers compared to the
Muslim Brotherhood's large following and the former regime's
lurking counter-revolutionaries.
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relatively small, a substantial percentage of women has gone
to the streets at least once over the course of the last eighteen
months. For a society that has traditionally demarcated politics
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